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Abstract — The issue of detecting malicious switches on 
the network is still a concern even as networks continue to 
grow more complex. Even though Wired networks are 
considered more secure than wireless, the wireless rogue 
device problem has been solved. However, the wired rogue 
switch problem remains unsolved.  
In this project, We apply core networking concepts and 
demonstrate a smart solution by combining the latest 
Automation techniques with highly effective software tool-sets 
available for detecting malicious systems connected to a rogue 
switch. This solution promises quick detection and requires 
Zero Downtime which could prove to be an ideal solution for 
enterprises having managed switch production networks.   
We achieve this by continuously filtering and analyzing 
network traffic for any broadcast storms or new Address 
Resolution protocol packets using Packet Analyzers and then 
effectively tracing the malicious host connected to the rogue 
switch by deploying automation techniques. This technique 
also helps detecting rogue unmanaged switches (“plug and 
play” devices) having pre-loaded configuration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We begin with looking at two typical types of switches in 
the Network Infrastructure – Managed and Unmanaged.  
The key difference between them lies in the fact that a 
managed switch can be configured and it can prioritize LAN 
traffic so that the most important information gets through[1].  
An unmanaged switch on the other hand behaves like a 
“plug and play” device. It comes pre-configured and simply 
allows the devices to communicate with one another. They do 
not have an IP address and some also have no MAC address 
which make them very difficult to trace. 
In this article, we initially put forwards the idea why this is 
an unsolved problem and what are the challenges that network 
administrators face to detect an unmanaged rogue switch on the 
network. Then we see some network concepts which help us 
get to the solution and we work on the solution in detail going 
through every step, collecting evidences to finally reach a 
conclusion. 
This smart solution is implemented and demonstrated by 
combining the latest Automation techniques with highly 
effective software tool-sets available for effectively detecting 
and tracing malicious systems connected to a rogue switch. 
II. CHALLENGES TO DETECT ROGUE SWITCH 
A. Unmanaged switches are untraceable 
An unmanaged switch comes pre-configured and simply 
allows the devices to communicate with one another. These are 
Datalink Layer (referring to the OSI layer model) devices and 
do not have IP addresses and therefore ICMP tools such as 
traceroute cannot be used to trace the device. Moreover, some 
unmanaged switches also do not have MAC address which 
means there will be no entry of the switch on any CAM table of 
other switches. This makes the job of a network administrator 
who is trying to trace the rogue switch extremely difficult. 
B. Discovery Protocols are ineffective 
Switches being a Layer 2 device means we can use 
discovery protocols which are used to monitor directly 
connected neighbors and update connectivity status. Examining 
these neighbor-ship protocols would let us know the connected 
switch  
The scope of this standard is to define a protocol and 
management elements, suitable for advertising information to 
stations attached to the same IEEE 802 LAN, for the purpose of 
populating physical topology and device discovery 
management information databases. The protocol facilitates the 
identification of stations connected by IEEE 802 LANs/MANs, 
their points of interconnection, and access points for 
management protocols[2]. 
However, such protocols such as LLDP (Link Layer 
Discovery Protocol), CDP (Cisco Discovery Protocol) will not 
be able to retrieve information about the connected rogue 
switch as most unmanaged switches do not support Discovery 
protocols, which means the managed switches CDP or LLDP 
updates won’t be acknowledged by the directly connected 
rogue switch and would totally bypass it. 
C. Even STP BPDUs can’t help detect rogue switches 
Bridge Protocol Data Units (BPDUs) are frames that 
contain information about the Spanning tree protocol (STP), 
which helps avoiding loops in the network. Managed Switches 
send BPDUs for STP algorithms to function, the switches need 
to share information about themselves and their connections. 
What they share are bridge protocol data units (BPDUs) [3]. 
Typically, a BPDU guard is configured on the ports of 
managed switches to examine STP and disables the port which 
receives BPDU packets if it’s not coming from a legitimate 
switch. However, Unmanaged switches do not have support 
STP and hence do not send BPDUs making this possibility of 
tracing it ineffective. 
D. IP sweep tools cannot capture rogue switch location 
Another possible way to detect a rogue switch is to 
somehow get some information about the hosts that are 
connected to that rogue switch. There is a possibility of running 
an IP sweep using tools in the entire LAN and examine the 
output for any anomalies in the network. These results can be 
utilized by the Network administrator to get clues on where to 
find the rogue switch and its actual physical connection on the 
network. 
Today, we have such IP sweep tools available to us like 
NMAP (Network Mapper) which is a security scanner which 
can be used for this purpose. It is used to 
discover hosts and services on a computer network, thus 
building a "map" of the network. To accomplish its goal, these 
tools sends specially crafted packets to the target host(s) and 
then analyzes the responses[4].  
Performing an IP sweep with such tools seems to be a good 
option, however, if you don't know what you are looking for it 
will be almost impossible to find. The problem with 
unmanaged switches is that there is no way to get information 
out of them as it has no management IP or supports SNMP. 
This makes finding the IP of the host connected to that rogue 
switch among a large pool of IP addresses impossible. The 
rogue switch remains entirely invisible to the mapping tool and 
does not show up in the topology map simulated by it.  
III. CONCEPTS LEADING TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The solution that this article proposes is based upon certain 
networking concepts like ACD (IP Address Conflict 
Detection), ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) and Broadcast 
packets in addition to Wireshark tool which is a packet sniffer 
that we shall use to analyze frames on the LAN. 
Before we actually work on the solution for detecting a 
rogue switch on the network, let’s understand few Network 
concepts that we will be using that lead us to the solution. 
A. ACD, ARP-Probe and ARP Announcement 
ACD, also known as Address Conflict Detection is a utility 
of IPv4 which is used to avoid IP conflict in a LAN 
environment. This applies to all IEEE 802 Local Area 
Networks (LANs)[802],including Ethernet [802.3], Token-
Ring [802.5], and IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [802.11] [5]. 
The ACD utility in IPv4 uses 'ARP Probe' a term used to 
refer to an ARP Request packet, broadcasted on the local link. 
Before beginning to use an IPv4 address (whether received 
from manual configuration, DHCP, or some other means), a 
Network Interface Card in a host must test to see if the address 
is already in use, by broadcasting ARP probe packets. 
An ARP Probe conveys both a question ("Is anyone using 
this address?") and an implied statement ("This is the address I 
hope to use."). 
ARP Probe packets are broadcasts with an all-zero 'sender 
IP address'. The 'sender hardware address' MUST contain the 
hardware address of the interface sending the packet.  The 
'sender IP address' field MUST be set to all zeroes. The 'target 
hardware address' field is ignored and SHOULD be set to all 
zeroes. The 'target IP address' field MUST be set to the address 
being probed. ARP Probe header as illustrated in Fig1.1 below. 
 
  Fig 1.1 – ARP Probe 
This process sends 3 ARP Probes, and if no one responds, 
the host officially claims the IP address with an ARP 
Announcement. Finally, the IP address is mapped to the 
physical address of the Source host. Fig1.2 below illustrates the 
ARP Announcement header when the host finally maps the 
physical address and tries to confirm if it has set a unique IP 
address on the LAN. 
 
  Fig 1.2 – ARP Announcement 
B. Switch behaviour when connected to a network 
• The switch table is initially empty. 
• For each incoming frame received on an interface, the 
switch stores in its table the MAC address in the 
frame’s source address field, the interface from which 
the frame arrived. In this manner the switch records in 
its table the LAN segment on which the sender resides. 
• There is no entry in the table for the Destination MAC. 
In this case, the switch forwards copies of the frame to 
the output buffers preceding all interfaces except for 
incoming interface. In other words, if there is no entry 
for the destination address, the switch broadcasts the 
frame [6]. 
• As soon as the hosts tries to initiate some connection to 
other hosts, the switch tries to learn MAC addresses by 
use of broadcasts. 
C. SNMP for monitoring 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is 
an Internet Standard protocol for collecting and organizing 
information about managed devices on IP networks and for 
modifying that information to change device behavior. Devices 
that typically support SNMP include cable modems, routers, 
switches, servers, workstations, printers, and more[7]. 
SNMP-managed network consists of two key components: 
• Agent – software which runs on devices that we want 
to monitor. This can be configured in such a manner 
that it sends Trap signal to the SNMP Manager 
reporting any unknown behavior on it. 
• Network management station (NMS) – software which 
runs on the manager. A network management 
station executes applications that monitor and control 
managed devices. 
IV. THE SOLUTION 
This section covers how we can collaborate all concepts 
defined and explained in the previous section and co-relate 
evidences gathered using those concepts to finally detect a 
Rogue switch in a network. 
Let us assume a network design as shown in Fig 1.3, where 
we see 4 managed switches S1, S2, S3, S4 are connected, 
distributing the network into 3 departments. Here, assuming no 
Port-security features are configured on the managed switch, 
meaning that anyone can walk in and plug in an unmanaged 
switch in one of the ports. Here we consider a Rogue switch is 
plugged in port 5 of Switch S4, as illustrated in Fig 1.3 below. 
We also observe from Fig 1.3 (circled and connection 
marked in ‘red’) that three hosts are connected to the rogue 
switch which are trying to consume the entire bandwidth of the 
LAN by downloading heavy files using Bit-Torrent from the 
Internet.
                     Fig 1.3 – Network Topology 
In this design, the internal LAN is connected to the Internet 
via a Router R1 and the host connection go through the router 
to establish a connection with the outside world. 
The following steps were implemented and demonstrated on a 
real network emulator under a testing environment setup. The 
implementation details will be discussed in the next section. 
GNS3 was used to setup the network topology, configured with 
real Cisco images. The solution was tested on a simple network 
as illustrated in fig 1.3 and also on a multi-VLAN complex 
network which also displayed the same results.  
A. Step 1 – Detect Brodcasts using SNMP 
As already discussed in the above section, we know that a 
switch’s CAM table initially has zero entries when it is plugged 
into an existing network unless a host gets connected to any 
port of that switch and tries to communicate. As soon as a host 
is plugged into one of rogue switch’s port, it will start 
broadcasting traffic to all ports as it has no MAC entries in its 
CAM table. This causes a broadcast storm on the network 
which is received by all switches in the network. 
All legitimate switches in the network are configured as 
SNMP agents and pick up these broadcasts. The agents are 
configured to report Broadcast storms in the network and send 
Trap signals to the SNMP Manager (As in Fig 1.3) on the 
network. 
These SNMP Trap messages will alert the Network 
Administrator. This broadcast storm indicates that a switch has 
been connected on the network, however, more evidence will 
be needed to find the physical location of the Rogue switch. 
 
B. Step 2 – Using Wireshark to examine ARP Probes 
We also discussed about ARP Probes and ARP 
announcements in the Section above. To trace the Rogue 
switch, we need to first trace the IP addresses of hosts that are 
connected to the rogue switch. We need to know exactly what 
we’re looking for on this busy network. 
We use Wireshark to sniff all ARP Probes around the time 
since we received an SNMP Trap for broadcasts in the network. 
Filtering ARP packets and looking for ARP Probes will give us 
the most recently configured IP addresses on the network, one 
of which can trace us back to the Rogue switch. 
Fig 1.4 illustrates the Wireshark trace showing 3 ARP 
Probe packets followed by an ARP announcement which shows 
the host attains an IP of 192.168.174.111. 
      Fig 1.4 – Packet capture 
Now, that we the host whose ARP probes corresponds to 
the same timestamp as the broadcast signal. We can use that IP 
to trace the Rogue switch. 
C. Step 3 - ARP table at the Router 
From the uplink router, it being a managed device the ARP 
entries can be seen for that specific IP as it has been 
downloading files from the Internet using Router R1.   
Once we get the MAC address of the Host, we can trace the 
switch going downwards from the Router to the switches.in 
their forwarding databases. The MAC found on a switch link 
can be traced by following the link to the next switch until you 
find the access-port on which the MAC is listed. This is where 
the malicious rogue switch is connected. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
GNS3 network emulator software and VM used for creating 
a virtual network topology using actual Cisco images. 
 
 Fig 1.5 – GNS 3 – Multi-VLAN Network topology 
 
WIRESHARK packet analyzer used for network monitoring  
and analyzing ARP and broadcasts. Monitoring of special ACD 
(Address Conflict Detection) packets proved vital in finding 
out the host IP connected to the rogue switch. 
 
 Fig 1.6 – ACD packet capture 
 
Python Scripts were implemented using the Netmiko library 
for configuring Cisco devices. Scripts were pushed on the 
Docker cloud container acting as the management system to 
automatically Trace the malicious system downwards from the 
uplink L3 device having its own ARP table using Python 
automation scripts.  
 
  Fig 1.7 – Technologies 
 
VI.  FUTURE WORK  
This article successfully demonstrates how to detect a rogue 
switch on the wired network, however, there is a lot of future 
scope for enhancing this solution into a fully functional 
centralized management tool for effective network 
management and with advanced fault detection features. 
Plans in place to continue building a fully functional 
centralized management tool with advanced GUI features. 
GUI features would include smart network configuration, 
backups, management and fault detection capabilities of 
network equipment. 
Full scale Integration with hardware networking equipment. 
A Wireshark plug-in could be developed providing full 
integration with the platform.   
VII. SOME MEASURES TO PROTECT YOUR NETWORK 
Authentication Servers – These are servers which provide 
authentication, authorization and accounting in the network 
environment. Authentication servers in combination with 2-
Factor or even 3-Factor authentication techniques should be 
used to secure the network of any unauthorized access. Shared 
secrets and Biometrics are used for this purpose. 
Biometric identifiers are most commonly used as part of a 
multifactor authentication system, combined with a password 
(something a person knows) or a token (something a person 
has) [8].  
Various biometric techniques and identifiers are being 
developed and tested, these include:  
• fingerprint recognition;  
• face recognition;  
• voice recognition;  
• keystroke recognition;  
• handwriting recognition;  
• finger and hand geometry;  
• retinal scan; 
• iris scan.   
 
Port Security – Many devices that support MAC filtering do so 
on a device basis. Whitelisted MAC addresses are allowed 
through any port on the device and blacklisted MAC addresses 
are blocked on all ports. When port security is configured, the 
default settings are to allow only one MAC address per port, 
and to shut down the port if the allowed number of addresses is 
exceeded [9]. Configuring port-security restricts the number of 
MAC addresses that can be connected to a switch port which 
will then automatically block any unauthorized switch 
connection. 
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